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Implementation and Revision of the Italian
Constitution Since the 1990s
Giulio M. Salerno
Department of Public Law and Theory of Government, University of Macerata, Macerata, Italy
This article describes the evolution of the Italian Constitution since 1990. A distinction is
made between a “rigid” Constitution and an applied or “living” Constitution. Laws that have
constitutional status and their limits are also examined. Moreover, the changing destiny of the
various “seasons of reform” of the Constitution and the long road towards the “implemental”
integration of the Constitution is also discussed. Finally, the role of the Constitutional Court
in relation to the Constitution and as the “guarantor of the constitutional conformity” of the
entire legal system is explained.
Keywords: Italian constitution, constitutional reforms, Constitutional Courts, administra-
tive law
WHAT IS THE ITALIAN CONSTITUTION
TODAY?
Our Constitution is something very different from a simple
piece of legislation. This solemn written document presents
itself as set in stone, and stands out, in terms of its supe-
rior legal value and force, from the laws normally approved
by Parliament. As we will see in more detail later on, the
Italian Constitution is no longer represented by the original
text, approved by the Constituent Assembly on December
22, 1947. Not only has this document been updated in sev-
eral places by the laws of constitutional status approved from
1948 onwards, it has also been modified by the laws of con-
stitutional revision approved up until the present day, and
particularly by the reforms implemented in the 1990s.
In addition, the Constitutional Court has operated on and
through the Constitution in carrying out its basic functions
as guarantor. As such, in order to glean a full understanding
of what the Italian Constitution is today, it is not sufficient
to read the content of the official texts. Rather, it is neces-
sary to go deeper into the subject, which is the purpose of
this article. We will delineate here the essential, indefectible
features of the Constitution; we will explain the procedures
through which it can be modified; we will describe the
Correspondence should be addressed to Giulio M. Salerno, Department
of Public Law and Theory of Government, University of Macerata, Piazza
Strambi 1, 62100 Macerata, Italy. E-mail: salerno@unimc.it
long process of implementation of the Constitution from the
time when it first entered into force; we will provide an
overview of the main seasons of reform that have affected
the Constitution; and, last of all, we will delineate the cen-
tral role played by the Constitutional Court in the execution
and implementation of the Constitution.
A “RIGID” CONSTITUTION
The first essential, indefectible feature of the Italian
Constitution is its rigidity. In actual fact, all of the modi-
fications that have thus far been made to the constitutional
text — which we will discuss in more detail later—are not
sufficient to demonstrate that the Italian Constitution has
become a “flexible” test. In this sense, the Constitution is
very much at odds with the Italian Statute granted by Charles
Albert in 1848, which, as is well-known, was easily repealed
and bypassed during the Fascist period. Italy’s legal system
affirms — almost unanimously — that ours is, and shall
always remain, a rigid Constitution.
What, then, do we mean when we refer to the rigidity
of the Constitution? This concept implies the necessity that
any modifications to the constitutional text be implemented,
as we will see later on, in line with an appropriate legislative
procedure — one that is at once not only different and more
complex and difficult than the normal legislative procedure,
but also directly disciplined and, therefore, guaranteed by
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the Constitution itself (cf. Articles 138–139). It requires that
revisions to the Constitution and the “other constitutional
laws” be passed by each chamber with two successive res-
olutions at an interval of no less than three months, and
approved with the absolute majority of the members of each
chamber at the second vote.
In addition, the laws in question can be subject to a
referendum, if requested — within three months of their
publication (for notification purposes) — by one-fifth of the
members of one of the chambers, or 500,000 voters or five
regional councils; in such cases, the constitutional law sub-
ject to the referendum is promulgated by the Head of state
if it is approved by a majority of valid votes. In any case, no
such referendum may be held when the law of constitutional
status has been approved at the second vote by each chamber
with a majority of two-thirds of its members (Article 138 of
the Constitution).
In general terms, then, the current Italian Constitution
certainly stands out from the previously valid Albertine
Statute, which although it was a written constitution, was
also flexible, in that it could be modified by ordinary law (or,
at least, this was the case until the introduction of laws that
were constitutional in character; cf. Law 2693/1928). By the
same token, our legal system also stands apart from those
(such as the ones that were in force in the European states
prior to the American and French Revolutions) in which the
Constitution — given its status as common law and, there-
fore, its necessary flexibility — can be modified both by
customs and by the law (a current example of this would
be the Constitution of the United Kingdom, which is the
joint result of customs and of the laws approved by the UK
Parliament).
THE WRITTEN CONSTITUTION AND THE
APPLIED CONSTITUTION
Ours is a written Constitution and it is only on the basis
of, and in compliance with, the written text that constitu-
tional norms can be justified. Certainly, it is also the case that
Italian law differentiates the written or formal Constitution
— meaning that set of norms contained within the con-
stitutional text — from the constitution as applied, which
is another thing entirely and is referred to as the “mate-
rial constitution.” This definition, made famous in Italy by
Costantino Mortati in his 1940 monograph, refers to the
set of ideal interests and political values and ends to which
the dominant forces prompt the state’s action, to such an
extent as to impose them as fundamental to, and charac-
teristic of, the structure of the social body. This would
give rise to the so-called “regime principles,” which would
be made normative(meaning that they would take on the
value of cogent legal norms, regardless of the content of the
written Constitution, and that they could be implemented
even contra constitutionem) and which would at the same
time be non-modifiable. It is clear, however, that accepting
such an interpretation means denying the value of our rigid
written Constitution, running the risk of bypassing or even
undermining it. This explains why said definition — the
“material constitution” — has hardly ever been used by the
Constitutional Court, which is the body charged with the
responsibility of safeguarding the Constitution and ensuring
compliance with it. In contrast, albeit in very few cases, the
Court has made use of “custom” as a source of norms of con-
stitutional status, but only for the purposes of implementing
or adding to the constitutional text, and never in a derogative
or, worse still, a modifying or abrogative sense in relation to
the content of the written Constitution.
The meaning of the applied constitution is very different,
since with this term the law denotes that wide-ranging —
and, in truth, rather imprecise — set of norms that, over and
above their insertion within the written Constitution, govern
through their content that which would be considered, in line
with the accepted interpretation, as a typical “constitutional
matter.” The applied constitution would deal, for example,
with the normative governance of those elements tradition-
ally considered to be constitutive of the state (populace,
territory, and sovereignty), or also those institutions from
time to time considered essential for the presence of that type
of state (for example, the electoral process, or the procedures
for the formation of laws and constitutional revision). The
flexibility and indeterminate nature of the notion of “con-
stitutional matter” is, however, clearly evident, to the extent
that the corresponding expression, used in the last section of
Article 72 of the Constitution, in relation to the procedure for
the formation of laws, was interpreted by the Constitutional
Court not by using standards based on objectivity, content,
or functionality, but rather by making it coincide with the
laws of constitutional status — i.e., those laws approved in
accordance with the procedure set out in Article 138 of the
Constitution (cfr. Ruling 168/1963), so that — almost para-
doxically — the meaning of “constitutional matter” depends
on the legislative procedure that is used by Parliament.
THE “LIVING” CONSTITUTION
The meaning of the expression “constitution in force” or
“living constitution” is different from the meaning of the
other expression thus far covered, because this is an expres-
sion that the law uses frequently to denote that set of norms
contained in the written Constitution in terms of their current
application and interpretation by, above all, constitutional
case law. This implies that not all of the written Constitution
is effectively in operation (see, for example, the case of
Article 39, on collective labor agreements), and that the
constitutional norms are defined by their effective imple-
mentation, which is put in place by legal practitioners. This
form of implementation is governed by the Constitutional
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Court in the exercising of its functions as the body respon-
sible for constitutional law. In this regard, the Constitutional
Court performs an important duty of guiding the interpreta-
tion of the constitutional norms, and does so also through
reference to its “precedents” (cf. Bin).
In this way, in accordance with the guidance provided by
the Constitutional Court, all of the written constitutional pro-
visions have the possibility of being tangibly implemented
through the legal system thus overcoming that interpreta-
tion, initially posited by the Supreme Court of Appeal, which
negated the possibility of effective legal status for the consti-
tutional provisions deemed to be merely program provisions
— meaning that they were indicative of mere objectives or
simple purposes that would have to be tangibly pursued in
the subsequent development of the legislative action and,
therefore, lacking in any cogent value — in contrast to
those provisions that immediately produced direct effects,
in that they were considered suitable for immediate applica-
tion and that they, therefore, embodied “full normativeness”
(Paladin). As such, the fully operational status of all of the
constitutional norms has been confirmed not only in rela-
tion to all the public functions (Dogliani), but also in relation
to all the components of the social body. In short, even the
most generic affirmation contained in the constitutional text
represents a limit for the laws in force, integrating them or
in any case representing a binding standard for their inter-
pretation (Crisafulli), even if there are cases (cf. Art. 39 of
the Constitution on collective agreements) in which, even at
constitutional level, it is possible to talk about disuse.
LAWS OF CONSTITUTIONAL STATUS
In any case, as indicated above, the constitutional provisions
are not immutable; on the contrary, the Constitution itself,
in the section on the “constitutional guarantees,” envisages
certain methods and conditions that must be respected for
the approval of both laws revising the Constitution and of
those expressly indicated as “the other constitutional laws”
(cf. Art. 138 and 139). In general terms, we are dealing again
with laws in the strict or formal sense, or with acts that,
as with the ordinary legal provisions we will discuss later,
are approved in terms of their content by the two chambers
and are subsequently promulgated by the Head of state. But
what distinguishes these laws of constitutional status from
ordinary laws is, in formal terms the presence of a different,
more laborious procedure that, as has been stated before, “is
grafted on to the trunk of the ordinary legislative procedure”
(Crisafulli); and in light of that more laborious procedure,
in terms of their substance or content, the aforementioned
categories of laws of constitutional status are able to imple-
ment legislation that acts at the constitutional level. The
distinction between the revision laws — intended to modify
the provisions set out by the Constitution — and the other
constitutional laws, which are geared towards implementing
provisions of a higher level than that of the ordinary laws,
has not been respected in practice, because in reality the two
categories are for the most part unified under the umbrella of
the category of the laws of constitutional status. These par-
ticular laws, then, are those that are capable of modifying,
partially repealing, abrogating or integrating the text of the
provisions set out by the Constitution.
LIMITS ON THE LAWS OF CONSTITUTIONAL
STATUS
Although, as has been said, the laws of constitutional sta-
tus have a legal power higher than those of the primary
sources they nevertheless do not have unlimited power. In
other words, even though they embody the highest level of
sovereign power within the legal system (and in this regard,
according to Crisafulli, they could be classified as having
“constituent power,” even though it is important to bear in
mind the opinion expressed by current law, which considers
even constitutional revision to be an expression of the “con-
stituted powers” since they are constitutionally founded and
defined; cf. most recently, Pace), the laws of constitutional
revision and the other constitutional laws come up against
the limits that are set out by, or that can be deduced from,
the Constitution.
First and foremost, there are the limits of form envisaged
by the Constitution, which means that the laws of consti-
tutional status are legally valid as long as they respect the
procedure set out by the Constitution, at least to the extent
that they themselves do not envisage the modification or par-
tial repealing of the Constitution, since they must in any
case respect — as current law has it — the supreme princi-
ples expressed by the constitutional regulations themselves
on the revision procedure, even though these principles are
not easily identified (cf. on this point, amongst many others,
Dogliani & Panunzio). This problem became particularly
evident when, in the 1990s, two temporarily applicable pro-
cedures that departed from the Constitution were approved,
as set out respectively in Constitutional Law No. 1 of 1993
and, even more exceptionally, in Constitutional Law No. 1 of
1997. These two procedures that modified the Constitution
were partially different from the procedure set out in Article
138 of the Constitution and were geared towards facilitat-
ing the modification of large parts of the Constitution itself.
These special procedures were not, however, sufficient, to
deliver the reforms that had been hoped for. As such, the
ordinary, general procedure for revising the Constitution was
applied again — the same procedure that had been effec-
tively used, as we will see shortly, on numerous occasions
during the latest of the seasons of “constitutional reform”
(i.e., the period that saw the approval of laws to revise the
Constitution in 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, and 2003).
In addition, there are limits on the content, in that the
Constitution itself, in its closing Article, prescribes that “the
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EVOLUTION OF THE ITALIAN CONSTITUTION SINCE 1990 117
republican form cannot be subject to constitutional revi-
sion” (Article 139). Greater significance is now attributed
to this provision, which was initially intended to prevent
the Republic — which replaced the monarchy following
the institutional referendum of 2 June 1946 — from being
overthrown by a law adopted by the same procedure of
constitutional revision. To this end, among the multiple, dif-
ferentiated interpretations that the law has put in place to
define the precise content of the notion of “republican form”
(cf. Reposo & Volpe), the most preferable would appear to
be that which takes into consideration not only the features
that traditionally distinguish republics from monarchies (in
short, an elected Head of state with a fixed term; cf. for all,
G.U. Rescigno), but also that which connotes our republi-
can form in its essential elements — i.e., the principle of
the unity and indivisibility of the Republic as proclaimed by
Article 5 of the Constitution (as stated by Paladin, who goes
on to link the republican form with the principle of popular
sovereignty expressed by Article 1 of the Constitution and,
consequently, with those principles that characterize our lib-
eral, pluralist democracy, meaning the principles put in place
to safeguard the freedoms classified as inviolable by Article
2 of the Constitution).
On closer inspection, the more the “republican form”
(protected by Article 139 of the Constitution) is filled up
with the normative content, the more likely it is that this
limit, positively provided for by the Constitution, ends up
leading back to those “implicit” or “logical” limits on con-
stitutional revision, the existence of which — albeit with a
strong diversity of accents — is not only accepted by cur-
rent law but is, in actual fact, authoritatively confirmed by
the Constitutional Court. Indeed, the Constitutional Court
highlighted the existence of “supreme principles” that, like
those envisaged by Article 139 of the Constitution, “can-
not be subverted or modified in their essential content either
by laws of constitutional revision or by other constitutional
laws,” and that “belong to the essence of the supreme values
on which the Italian Constitution is founded” (Constitutional
Court 1146/1988).
In particular, when the Constitutional Court demanded
that the laws of constitutional status be checked, it made
specific reference to the limits it had already identified for
each type of provision — such as those contained in the
composition sources as per Article 7 of the Constitution or
those that execute the treaties of the Communities and of the
European Union — which, although of primary status, are
partially able to depart from the constitutional provisions;
and it can also be briefly restated that the limits applied on
these occasions were those relating to the “inalienable rights
of the individual” and to the “fundamental” or “supreme
principles” of the constitutional legal system, which are also,
therefore, connected to the organization and functionality of
the public powers.
For example, in constitutional legislation the following
principles were classified as “supreme principles of the
legal system of the state”: the sovereignty of the popu-
lace; the unity of state legislation; the unity of constitutional
legislation; faithful collaboration between the powers of the
state and between the state and the regions; and the laity
of the state (cf. Constitutional Court 175/1973, 30/1971,
6/1970, 35/1985, 203/1989). The question of whether —
and if so, to what extent — constitutional unrevisability
(i.e., the constitutional illegitimacy of a law of constitutional
revision that violates the same principle) derives from the
definition of a certain legal principle — connected to the
organizational make-up of the public powers — as being
“fundamental” or “supreme,” is discussed in texts on legal
theory (cf. for all, Zanon).
ARE “REFORMS” OF THE CONSTITUTION
PERMITTED?
Above all, the question is whether through a comprehensive
reform of the Constitution it is possible at the same time to
modify a plurality of institutions or parts of the Constitution.
The opposing hypothesis — which was undermined by the
major reform of the second part of the Constitution approved
in 2001 — is based on the fact that, as we will see, the
law of constitutional revision may be subject to a popular
referendum and that, in cases of “heterogeneous” constitu-
tional reform the people would not be free to express their
own vote, being constrained to vote yes or no on the entire
constitutional law and not on the individual parts. In truth,
the popular vote is required not in order to allow the cit-
izens to participate in determining the law, but, rather, to
verify the existence or otherwise of popular consent with
respect to the overall will for reform already expressed by
the representative bodies in the respective resolutions. From
this perspective, it must, therefore, be concluded that our
legal system permits the simultaneous modification of con-
stitutional provisions relating to a plurality of institutions or
portions of the fundamental Charter, without there being any
constitutional necessity that requires the distribution of said
modifications across several revision laws that are presump-
tively “homogeneous” in terms of their content, subject or
purposes.
In order to address such a complicated question, it is
important to underline one or two more immediately evi-
dent features: first and foremost, from the perspective of
the political opportunity, removing from the constitutional
revision yet more principles with respect to those indicated
positively by the provisions of the Constitution certainly
does not make the current Constitution more solid. Indeed,
history has shown that the more rigid the revision of the con-
stitutional charter, the greater the reduction of the necessary
capacity of the Constitution to adapt to social evolution, thus
favoring the recourse to de facto acts — i.e., to the break-
ing of the law. From the strictly legal/normative perspective,
then, there are authoritative legal opinions — backed-up by a
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wealth of arguments — that deny, for example, equivalence
between the unrevisability of the Constitution and the invio-
lability of rights (see Pace). Last, the use of “values theory,”
with the intrinsic discretion that it allows when interpret-
ing and evaluating the law, casts the law into considerable
doubt (Rimoli), which does not appear to be overcome even
if it is claimed, as has been authoritatively stated, that the
supreme principles would not be equivalent to “hierarchi-
cally superior norms,” but rather, would express “essential
and categorical values both in the construction and interpre-
tation of norms (including those set out by the constitutional
sources) and in the evaluation of their constitutionality”
(Modugno).
THE LONG ROAD TOWARDS THE
“IMPLEMENTAL” INTEGRATION OF THE
CONSTITUTION
With the coming into force of the Constitution, on January
1,1948, not all of the bodies and institutions that it envisaged
began functioning immediately. Indeed, the period since
1948 has seen the approval of numerous laws — both ordi-
nary and of constitutional status — that are geared towards
implementing those parts of the Constitution that, in the
absence of said laws, would have remained ineffective. It
can be said, then, that the constitutional laws approved to
that end actually integrated the text of the Constitution in
order to implement it more completely. In general terms, it
is, therefore, correct to state that the Constitution currently in
force is the result of the document approved in 1947 as inte-
grated by said laws of constitutional status and as specified
and clarified by the ordinary laws of implementation.
During the first legislature (1948–1953), a number of
laws were passed that govern the exercising of constitutional
justice (constitutional laws 1/48 and 1/53, and ordinary
law 87/53), but the Constitutional Court only came into
being in 1956, the National Council of the Economy and
Labor in 1957 (Law 33/57), and the Upper Council of the
Magistrature in 1958 (Law 195/58). The implementation
of the regional legal system in relation to the regions of
“ordinary autonomy” was particularly slow. In relation to the
regions of special autonomy, the statutes of Sicily, Sardinia,
Trentino-Alto Adige, and Valle d’Aosta were adopted by the
same Constituent Assembly through constitutional laws 2, 3,
4 and 5 of 1948; indeed, the Sicilian statute had been in force
since 1946. The Friuli Venezia Giulia Region had to wait for
the passing of constitutional law no. 1 of 1963, which also
saw the establishment of the Molise Region.
In terms of the regions of ordinary autonomy, as far back
as the first legislature, Law 62/53 had put in place norms
for the constitution and functionality of the regional bod-
ies, but for the effective establishment of these regions it
proved necessary to wait until the end of the 1960s and into
the subsequent decade. It was at that time that Law 108/68
was passed upon the election of the regional councils —
which took place on April 18, 1970 — along with budget
law 281/70 (which, however, also regulated the other mat-
ters concerning regional reform), laws 480/71 and 519/719
(passed on May 22, 1971), which approved the statutes
passed in the meantime by the regional councils, and vari-
ous decrees to transfer certain administrative functions from
the state to the regions (January 14, 15, 1971).
For the sake of completeness, it should be borne in mind
that, with delegation law 382/75 and the consequent leg-
islative decree 616/77, the sphere of regional autonomy was
substantially expanded (perhaps even beyond certain consti-
tutional limits) and that, with constitutional law 1/71 (inte-
grated with numerous other provisions — cf. Presidential
Decree 670/72), the special statute of Trentino-Alto Adige
was profoundly altered, attributing to the two provinces the
status of bona fide regions. Another constitutional fulfill-
ment that had been delayed for years but was made necessary
by the question of divorce (which had become so press-
ing in that period), was the approval of law 372/70, which
regulated the direct democratic institutions envisaged by
the Constitution — i.e., the popular initiative of laws and
referendums.
REVISIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION: THE
CHANGING DESTINY OF THE VARIOUS
“SEASONS OF REFORM”
It would, however, be difficult to understand what the cur-
rent Constitution is without also analyzing the modification,
of constitutional status, to the document approved in 1947.
Indeed, in the 60+ years since it came into force, the
Constitution has undergone numerous modifications, which
have been implemented through laws of constitutional revi-
sion or approved through the special procedure envisaged by
Article 138 of the Constitution.
A number of revisions were implemented in the 1960s,
including: constitutional law 2/63, which altered the numer-
ical composition of the chamber and the Senate and reduced
the duration of the Senate’s legislature to five years, bringing
it in line with the legislature of the chamber; constitutional
law 1/67, according to which the prohibition of extradition
for political crimes does not apply to crimes of genocide;
and constitutional law 2/67, which modified the provisions
on the appointment and duration of tenure of the judges in
the Constitutional Court.
After a long pause, a number of constitutional reforms
were approved at the end of the 1980s and the start of the
1990s. These were mostly connected to the tumultuous polit-
ical events that characterized that period: constitutional law
1/89, relating to the penal responsibilities of ministers for
crimes committed in exercising their duties, removing the
authority from the Constitutional Court and granting it to
the ordinary criminal justice system; constitutional law 1/91
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allowed — under certain conditions — the President of the
Republic to dissolve in advance the chambers even during
the last six months of his or her mandate; constitutional law
1/1992, concerning amnesty and pardons, eliminating the
intervention of the Head of state and introduced a legislative
procedure constrained by extremely onerous processes; and,
last but not least, constitutional law 3/1993 reformulating
the guarantees of incontestability of members of parliament
and making it possible for members of parliament to be
subject to criminal procedures without authorization of the
relevant chamber. This season of reforms was essentially
linked to the relations between the political sphere and that
of the judiciary, and the results cannot be considered wholly
positive or fully satisfactory, since numerous crucial issues
remained unresolved or, worse, compromised by some of the
constitutional choices made during this period.
From the end of the 1990s, following the failure of the
derogative procedures highlighted above, use was made once
again of Article 138 of the Constitution and a major process
of constitutional reform was undertaken, this time focus-
ing on the strictly institutional profiles of the legal system.
Of particular relevance were the following reforms: con-
stitutional law 1/1999, which modified various articles of
the fifth section of the second part of the Constitution on
regional autonomy, accentuating above all the role of the
President of the Regional Council and attributing statu-
tory autonomy to the ordinary regions; constitutional law
2/1999, which introduced a wide-ranging set of regula-
tions on the principal of due process; constitutional laws
1/2000 and 1/2001, which granted the vote to Italians resid-
ing overseas, reserving to these voters a certain number
of parliamentarians; constitutional law 3/2002, which pro-
foundly altered the criteria for subdividing the legislative
remit between the state and the regions, as well as other
provisions of the fifth section of the second part of the
Constitution, relating to the legal system of the regions and
the other territorial bodies; constitutional law 1/2002— in
relation to the members and descendants of the House of
Savoy — reducing the prohibition on their right of access
to public offices and to the active and passive electorate,
and for the male descendants permitting entry and resi-
dence within Italian territory; constitutional law 1/2003,
which boosted the commitment of the Republic to promote,
through appropriate provisions, equal opportunities for men
and women; and, last of all, constitutional law 1/2007, abol-
ishing the exception that had allowed the death penalty to
be applied in those cases envisaged by the military laws
of war.
In total, up to the present day, 15 laws of constitu-
tional revision have been approved. These revisions have
acted upon thirty-two articles of the original text of the
Constitution: given that the Constitution approved in 1947
was composed of 139 articles, this means that a little over
a quarter of the articles have been modified to one extent or
another.
In the main — with the exception of certain modifica-
tions relating to side issues, so to speak, such as the return
of the descendants of the House of Savoy — the reform
process has been geared towards making the constitutional
text more current and relevant, integrating into it principles
and institutions that are by now widespread across west-
ern democracies, some of the most salient aspects being:
institutional decentralization; the vote for citizens residing
overseas; gender equality; and the absolute prohibition of the
death penalty.
However, it is certainly the case that the first three of the
aforementioned constitutional revisions have both wholly
positive and less positive aspects. In particular, the reform
of the system of relationships between the state and the
autonomous territorial bodies has created, as is well-known,
a number of problems of application, and certain aspects
already appear to be in need of further reform. The overseas
vote, albeit correct in principle, poses serious problems of
probity and transparency that must necessarily be resolved.
For their part, the constitutional regulations on equal gender
opportunities have been formulated as a merely promotional
norm that requires the intervention of the legislator and,
moreover, they fail to set out clear guidelines on the recurrent
problem of the introduction of the so-called “pink quotas” in
electoral competitions. Last of all, it is essential to highlight
that the current constitutional text appears seriously deficient
in relation to two widely felt requirements: military activities
for purposes of international security, on the one hand, and
the process of European integration, on the other.
Military activities are still regulated on a case-by-case
basis, giving rise on occasion to doubts of the constitutional-
ity of the procedures implemented, for example in relation to
the role of the Parliament and of the Head of state. European
integration — with the exception of the odd recent refer-
ence in constitutional law, which has initiated a consolidated
process of decentralization for the benefit of the territorial
autonomies — continues to be governed by the constitu-
tional principle that allows for “limitations of sovereignty”
in favor of international legal systems that ensure “peace and
justice among nations” (Article 11 of the Constitution). This
is a true “Italian exception” in relation to the other European
constitutions — an exception that many would like to see
left behind, even though certain doubts may be raised, for
example on the possibility that such a constitutional revision
would permit that form of popular intervention on certain
questions that is currently precluded by Article 75 of the
Constitution.
It should, however, be borne in mind that the failure of
the latest constitutional reform of the second part of the
Constitution — rejected by the popular vote in 2006 —
presumably makes yet more challenging the task of those
who wish to proceed with further constitutional revisions.
This would certainly be the case if an attempt was made to
approve said reforms simply through the support of the par-
liamentary majority, as occurred for revision law 3 of 2001
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and the failed revision of 2006. The complicity of the oppo-
sition forces — an element that had been considered almost
natural up until constitutional law 3 of 2001 — seems now
to have returned to being considered a necessary element
in the effort to get approval on reforms that are actually
capable of achieving the widest consensus in the legal sys-
tem. Compromise solutions on the constitutional level are
not a sign of weakness — rather, they are the result of the
appropriate search for points of balance between the various
positions.
THE ROLE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL
COURT IN RELATION TO THE CONSTITUTION
It cannot be denied that the living Constitution is also formed
thanks to the primary role played by the Constitutional
Court, so it is appropriate to devote some time to describ-
ing the remit of this body, which is crucial in ensuring the
overall coherence of the legal system with respect to the
Constitution.
The Constitutional Court is envisaged and governed
through the final section of the second part of the
Constitution, which relates to “constitutional guarantees.”
This positioning immediately clarifies the remit of the Court
in terms of the overall design of the constitution: the Court is
responsible for a plethora of jurisdictional functions that are
directly linked to the safeguarding of the constitutional prin-
ciples and provisions and to the repression of certain types
of acts that are damaging to the rules underpinning our legal
system. Specifically, the remit of the Constitutional Court
encompasses four distinct areas: passing judgment on the
constitutional legitimacy of the laws of the state, the regions,
and the autonomous Provinces of Trento and Bolzano, and
of acts with state legal force; passing judgment on con-
flicts of attribution between the powers of the state, between
the state and the regions or the autonomous Provinces of
Trento and Bolzano, or between the regions; passing judg-
ment on accusations relating to so-called “presidential”
crimes of the head of state; and passing judgment on the
admissibility of requests for abrogative referenda submit-
ted in accordance with Article 75 of the Constitution. This
does not mean, however, that respect for the constitutional
norms is not also ensured by other constitutional organs:
for example, the President of the Republic does so when
promulgating laws or issuing acts with legal force (similar
to Constitutional Court 406/1989). However — since the
Court has the exclusive remit over those functions that, as
defined by the Constitution, determine the sphere of justice
or of constitutional jurisdiction — a founding principle of
our constitutional legal system is that the aforementioned
attributions cannot be broken apart or attributed to other
public bodies, not even through norms of constitutional
status.
In particular, on the basis of this principle of the unity
of the constitutional jurisdiction, the High Court for the
Sicilian Region had its powers reduced. The Sicilian statute
— adopted prior to the Constitution coming into force,
and subsequently converted into constitutional law — had
previously attributed to the High Court powers including
the right to pass judgment on the constitutional legitimacy
of state laws and regional Sicilian laws. As such, only the
Constitutional Court is permitted to decide on the con-
stitutionality of the law, meaning that only it can pass
judgment on the political bodies — which are directly rep-
resentative of the people — when exercising the legislative
function attributed to them (cf. Articles 70 and 117 of the
Constitution) as regards whether or not they are respect-
ing the Constitution — i.e., implementing acts that are
aligned with the principle of constitutional legality. This
monitoring function is strictly linked to the rigidity of the
Constitution and to the hierarchical subordination of the law
to the fundamental text of the Republic. The judgment on
the constitutionality of laws is put in place as the constitu-
tional “limit,” as per the general provision of Article 1 of
the Constitution, making it one of the most important forms
through which sovereignty can be exercised. In this sense,
it can be said that the principle of legality, intrinsic to the
rule of law, is completed by the principle of constitutional
legality, which connotes and justifies the very definition of
the constitutional state. With the establishment of the consti-
tutional jurisdiction, another step towards constitutionalism
can be said to have been taken: the law adopted by the repre-
sentative bodies is not a source without limits, but — since it
is hierarchically subordinate to the Constitution, it becomes
open to review by a third, impartial body that ascertains
its compliance in terms of the Constitution (the so-called
“parameter” of constitutionality).
THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT AS THE
“GUARANTOR OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL
CONFORMITY” OF THE ENTIRE LEGAL
SYSTEM
In performing its role as the guarantor of the Constitution,
the Constitutional Court carries out the duty of ensuring
the most comprehensive “constitutional conformity” of the
entire legal system. In particular, this duty has its source in
three aspects that have come to the fore to an ever greater
extent through the examination of constitutional legitimacy,
particularly from the 1990s onwards. First of all, among the
flaws of legal constitutionality that the Constitutional Court
has claimed that it has been able to apply, there has been
the flaw defined as “excess of legislative power.” This flaw
has been developed by taking its cue from administrative
jurisprudence and from the flaw of excessive power con-
figured therein to evaluate the fairness of the exercising of
discretion in the adoption of administrative provisions, or,
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rather, the diversion or deviation of the act from the objective
of public interest that said act is by law intended to fulfill. It
is, indeed, true that the law constrains the Court to exclude
from its examination of constitutional legitimacy “any eval-
uation of a political nature and any examination of the use
of the discretionary power of the Parliament” (cf. Article 28
of Law 87/1953); the intention here is to prevent the Court
from ever using its own political evaluation – i.e., an evalua-
tion “based on merit” — rather than that already carried out
by the legislator.
However, that said, the Court can certainly examine
respect for constitutional principles that impose certain
conditions— at times indicated with very generic, inde-
terminate clauses — for which the law ends up being
“functionalized,” so to speak, by the Constitution (for exam-
ple, the reinforced legal reserves and the conditions imposed
therein). Or, on the basis of the principle of equality, the
Court may carry out an evaluation of the reasonableness
of the law in terms of symptomatic figures that are mostly
similar to those adopted by the administrative jurisdiction—
i.e., when the law has flaws relating to its internal logic, to
the contradictions between means and ends, to the ground-
lessness of motives that justify exceptions or differences of
treatment, and so forth. In other words, if the law is no longer
“free in its purposes” (as per Guarino’s famous concept), but
appears constrained to be implemented in a way that respects
the constitutionally imposed ends — and specifically, within
the standard of reasonableness — this also reflects on the
examinations of the Constitutional Court, which tends to
make itself more incisive on the “overall correctness” of the
legislation, albeit using methods that are not always uniform.
Second, the Constitutional Court has affirmed, from its
first ruling, that its examination of constitutional legitimacy
can also encompass the laws — and the acts of equal sta-
tus — that already existed at the time when the Constitution
came into force (cf. Constitutional Court 1/1957, where
the judge was permitted to ascertain the completion of the
abrogation of the laws themselves, due to the continued
existence of an incompatible provision of constitutional sta-
tus). The checking of said sources relates only to material
flaws and, in exceptional circumstances, to formal flaws
(since said acts certainly may not be examined in relation
to procedural laws that did not exist at the time of their
formation). In such instances, the ascertained unconstitu-
tionality is deemed to have “arisen,” meaning that it began
at the time when the Constitution came into force. This has
allowed the Constitutional Court to bring into line with the
Constitution many provisions that had previously been in
force – i.e., those approved under the statutory regime or
the Fascist regime — thereby resolving the state of uncer-
tainty that resulted from the position taken by the judges
who, before the Constitutional Court came into force, had
attributed abrogative effectiveness only to the constitutional
provisions that produced direct effects and not to those
so-called program provisions (cf. on this point, Crisafulli).
Third, it is important to underline the interpretative auton-
omy that is ever more frequently asserted by the Court in
relation to the “terms” of its judgment, since these terms
are outlined by the subjects — specifically, the judges —
who raise the questions of constitutionality. This autonomy
has allowed the Constitutional Court substantial freedom of
movement, which sometimes appears to exceed the limit of
the “non ultra petita rule” – i.e., the principle that requires
the Court to make judgments only on that which is requested
of it. In particular, the interpretative autonomy has facilitated
the emergence of pronouncements by the Constitutional
Court that annul only certain norms inferable from the leg-
islative provision, so that said provision continues to form
part of the letter of the law. This is the requirement of a rather
important phenomenon — that of interpretative rulings,
which allow the Constitutional Court considerable room to
maneuver, enabling the formation of pronouncements that
do not directly affect the letter of the law, affecting instead
their prescriptive meaning. However, this results in uncer-
tainty as to application, and perhaps, then, does not ensure,
in concrete terms, the most effective form of implementa-
tion of the Constitution in terms of individual and collective
behavior.
By the same token, it should be borne in mind that, from
the 1990s onwards, the Court has asked the judges who
raise questions of constitutionality to make a preliminary
interpretative effort – i.e., to identify a compliance-focused
interpretation of the legislative text that allows the law a nor-
mative signification that is coherent with the Constitution.
Only if said effort is made and the judge demonstrates that
it is not possible to take from the law any interpretation that
complies with the Constitution does the court deem admissi-
ble the question submitted for it to rule upon. While with this
“filter” of admissibility the Court constrains the judges who
must reconstruct the laws in coherence with the Constitution,
this approach also runs the risk of reducing the margins of
intervention of the examination of constitutionality. In sum,
the role of the Constitutional Court has made it possible for
the Constitution to mirror with increasing effectiveness the
real events in which citizens are all involved. It is, however,
important to ensure that the forms of intervention used by the
Court make the Constitution truly clear and evident – i.e., a
source of principles that are ever more widely recognized
and applied across the entire legal system.
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